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Abstract
Motivated by the concept of quantum pseudo-telepathy games as well
as by quantum key distribution protocols such as [1], the security of which
is based on the non-signaling principle, we try to answer the question
wheather it is possible to generate a perfectly secure, shared bit between
two parties by a single usage of quantum correlations and a performance
of local operations on the input and output.
We provide both parties with some prior shared entanglement and the
possibility of postselection, e.g. discard of inputs and outputs, aiming
to prevent any eavesdropper bound by the non-signaling condition from
successfully performing an attack.
After, in a first step, defining the framework and setting up the require-
ments we are going to see that quantum mechanics does not allow for a
physical simulation of such correlations.
For the case of binary output we will even see that, in order to make
perfectly correlated bits perfectly secure, we would need maximal non-
local correlations which also prohibits a quantum physical representation.
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1 Introduction
It is well known how to generate common secret shared bits for key agreement
using quantum mechanics, as for example in [1]. Those schemes have in common
that, in order to achieve a certain degree of secrecy, a part of the input gets
discarded.
However, among the results of the magic square game (see Definition 3.1 for more
details) resides a shared bit, the intersection bit, which seems to be secret up
to the moment of announcement by Alice and Bob. It turns out to be a natural
question to ask wheather Alice and Bob, by not publishing any information,
would share a perfectly secret bit which could further be used for key agreement.
This would mean that the usage of a quantum-physical system in combination
with some local operations as for example retention or discard of input or output
information would equip us with a single usage device for generating common
secret bits. So in the rest of the paper we are going to investigate the demands
on those devices and we are going to see that, unfortunately, quantum mechanics
excludes a physical representation of those.
We will use the terms of boxes with input and outputs, meaning that we have
some prior shared entanglement on which measurement in a certain base (input)
can be performed, giving rise to measurement results (output).
2 Preliminaries
In the context of bipartite quantum systems, two players named Alice and Bob
share joint quantum state ρ on H, where
H = HA ⊗HB
withHA being Alice’s Hilbert space andHB being Bob’s, respectively. Although
we have a finite number of dimensions we do not restrict ourselves on its number,
so we can assume that ρ is in a pure state and that its density operator ρ, defined
[7] by
ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|,
has the property that tr(ρ2) = 1. We further assume that Alice and Bob perform
projective measurements, described by two sets of projection operators, namely
{Eα} where Eα = E˜α⊗I, acting on Alice’s system and {Eβ} where Eβ = E˜β⊗I
acting on Bob’s system, for which holds that∑
α
Eα = 1∑
β
Eβ = 1
as well as
EαEα′ =
{
Eα if α = α′
0 otherwise
(1)
When applied on state ρ, the possible outcome of a measurement can be
described as follows:
Pr(αβ) = tr(EαEβρ). (2)
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In the case ρ being a pure state, this probability can be written equivalently as
Pr(αβ) = 〈ψ|EαEβ |ψ〉. (3)
3 Quantum Pseudo-Telepathy Games
To explain the concept of quantum pseudo-telepathy games, consider the follow-
ing, illustrative, scenario, where Alice and Bob claim to have telepathic powers
[2]. In order to prove this, Alice and Bob build up a large distance between them
and ask Xavier and Yolanda to name values to them, i.e. Xavier to Alice a value
x ∈ X and Yolanda to Bob a value y ∈ Y having the same distribution. Upon
having received their inputs simultaneously, Alice and Bob immediately output
”yes” if they both got the same input value or ”no” otherwise. Because of the
large distance, the possibility of communication, in particular of agreeing on a
specific output, is impossible. This means that in case Alice and Bob winning
this game with overwhelming probability, the only explanation in a classical
world would be telepathy.
The game described above cannot be won with the help of quantum mechanics,
but there are other similar games for which there exists no classical winning
strategy, whereas the game can be won if some prior entanglement is shared.
The term pseudo telepathy is rooted in the fact that for any classical observer
there is no other explanation than telepathy, while in the world of quantum
mechanics it all can be described physically.
Definition 3.1. [2] A two partite game is defined as a sextuple G = 〈X,Y,A,B, P,W 〉,
where
 X and Y are the input sets for Alice and Bob.
 A and B are the output sets.
 P ⊆ X × Y is a predicate on X × Y , called promise or probability dis-
tribution on X × Y . If not stated differently, X and Y are uniformly
distributed.
 W ⊆ X × Y ×A×B is also a predicate, called the winning condition.
Definition 3.2. A strategy between Alice and Bob is called a classical strategy
if their output only depends on the deterministic mappings X → A and Y → B
and some shared randomness. It is called a quantum strategy if Alice and Bob
share some prior entanglement on which they can perform measurements in
order to get their output values.
Definition 3.3. [2] We call a game as defined in 3.1 a pseudo-telepathy game
if there is no winning strategy with success probability equal to 1 for Alice and
Bob as classical players, yet it admits such a winning strategy for Alice and Bob
following a quantum strategy.
Note that for a quantum pseudo telepathy game we require a quantum win-
ning strategy with success probability equal to 1. As an example please have a
look at the Magic Square Game described in subsection 3.1.
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3.1 Magic Square Game
A magic square, in the context of quantum pseudo telepathy games, is a binary
matrix M of dimension 3× 3 where the parity of all rows is even and the parity
of all columns is odd. In order to see that such a matrix is magic indeed, lets
consider the following matrix:
M =
1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 x
(4)
If x = 0 the parity condition of the third column, if x = 1 the parity condition
of the third row is violated.
The magic square game can formally be described as G = 〈X,Y,A,B,W 〉 with
 X = Y = {1, 2, 3}
 A = B = {0, 1}3 (Basically, Alice is asked to output the x-th row and Bob
is asked to output the y-th column). Let, for example, a(i) ∈ {0, 1} be
the i-th bit of Alice’s output row.
 W is is fulfilled, if
– Alice’s row has even parity: a(3) = a(1)⊕ a(2)
– Bob’s column has odd parity: b(3) = 1⊕ b(1)⊕ b(2)
– row and column agree on intersection bit: a(y) = b(x)
As we have seen, such a magic square cannot exist. This means that the best
strategy for classical players is to assign binary values to eight of the nine entries
of the magic square, as for example in (4), admitting a success probability of
8/9. But anyhow, there is a quantum winning strategy as described in [2]. First,
Alice and Bob share the entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1
2
|0011〉 − 1
2
|0110〉 − 1
2
|1001〉+ 1
2
|1100〉, (5)
where the first two qubits belong to Alice and the second two to Bob. Upon
receiving their input, Alice and Bob apply each one of the following unitary
transformations accordingly, i.e. Alice applies A1 if her input is 1 and so on.
A1 = 1√2

i 0 0 1
0 −i 1 0
0 i 1 0
1 0 0 i
 , B1 = 12

i −i 1 1
−i −i 1 −1
1 1 −i i
−i i 1 1

A2 = 12

i 1 1 i
−i 1 −1 i
i 1 −1 −i
−i 1 1 −i
 , B2 = 12

−1 i 1 i
1 i 1 −i
1 −i 1 i
−1 −i 1 −i

A3 = 12

−1 −1 −1 1
1 1 −1 1
1 −1 1 1
1 −1 −1 −1
 , B3 = 1√2

1 0 0 1
−1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 −1 0

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After Alice and Bob have applied their transformations, they measure their bits
in the computational basis, which results in the first two output bits for each.
The third bit is then chosen w.r.t. parity. So if we have for example inputs
x = 2 and y = 3, we get the following computation [2]:
(A2 ⊗B3)|ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
[|0000〉 − |0010〉 − |0101〉+ |0111〉 (6)
+|1001〉+ |1011〉 − |1100〉 − |1110〉]
The measurement result Alice and Bob obtain could be 10 and 01 which means
that Alice would complement with 1 and Bob with 0, resulting in a = 101
and b = 010. As a and b agree on the intersection bit, Alice and Bob win
this round of the game. The verification for all possible inputs is tedious but
straightforward.
4 Framework
We want to study the following scenario, where we have three players, Alice,
Bob and Eve. All three of them are non signalling, e.g., they are restricted by
the impossibility of superluminal signalling. The goal of Alice and Bob is to
generate a shared secret bit, about which Eve, in the role of the eavesdropper,
must not be able to learn anything. We want to give Eve as much power as
possible, putting her in charge of providing physical systems, on which Alice
and Bob can perform measurements in order to get their shared secret bit. The
behavior of those physical systems and their results of a measurement can be
described as a input-output box.
Definition 4.1. A box is a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY where
X and Y are the input sets, A and B are the output sets of Alice and Bob.
For example, PA,B|X=x,Y=y(0, 1) denotes the probability of output A = 0 and
B = 1, given X = x and Y = y. Equivalently, we will use the notation P (ab|xy)
denoting the probability of A = a, B = b, given X = x and Y = y.
Definition 4.2. A box is non-signalling, if the following holds:∑
b
P (ab|xy) =
∑
b
P (ab|xy′) = P (a|x) ∀a, x, y, y′ (7)
∑
a
P (ab|xy) =
∑
a
P (ab|x′y) = P (b|y) ∀b, x, x′, y (8)
Concrete, a secret bit agreement protocol step might look as follows: Alice
and Bob are provided a box P by Eve. They both take a x ∈ X and a y ∈ Y as
input for the box. These input values are either form Eve, or they are chosen by
Alice and Bob and then made public through an authenticated channel. After
obtaining the output of the box, in order to generate a perfectly secret shared
bit, Alice and Bob are allowed to perform some additional local operations,
described in Section 8. As Eve is the one preparing and distributing the boxes,
she might send boxes which do not have the input-output statistics as claimed
by her. In order to prevent this, Alice and Bob can test those boxes by using
a large number N of boxes, revealing and comparing (testing) the outputs for
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random N −1 boxes and keeping the results for one box secret. In the following
we will assume that the boxes have been tested and that they indeed work as
expected.
5 PR Box
The Popescu Rohrlich machine is a non-local box with binary input (X = Y =
{0, 1}) and binary output (A = B = {0, 1}) for which the following holds:
Pr[A⊕B = X · Y ] = 1 (9)
The next figure is an illustration of the PR box:
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHA
B
0 1 0 1
0
0 1
2 0
1
2 0
1 0 12 0
1
2
1 0
1
2 0 0
1
2
1 0 12
1
2 0
(10)
Bell’s theorem states that any box acting like the box above with a probability
superior to 75% is non-local, which means that the PR box is actually maxi-
mally non-local. To see this, we can compute the expectation value of the Bell
Operator:
E[B] = E[X+1Y+1] + E[X+1Y−1] + E[X−1Y+1]− E[X−1Y−1] (11)
Note that E[X+1Y−1] denotes the expected result of the multiplication of the
outputs, given that Alice had input 0 (+1) and Bob had input 1 (-1). With
respect to the NL box described in (10) we can now compute
E[B] = 1 + 1 + 1− (−1) = 4, (12)
which implies a maximal violation of Bell’s inequality.
5.1 The eight PR Boxes
Let us now consider the set of the following non-signalling probability distribu-
tions for r, s, t ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr,s,t(ab|xy) =
{
1
2 if r ⊕ (a⊕ b) ≡2 (s⊕ x)(t⊕ y)
0 otherwise
(13)
So for r = s = t = 0 we have
P0,0,0(ab|xy) =
{
1
2 if a⊕ b ≡2 xy
0 otherwise
(14)
which corresponds to the PR box described in (10).
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Lemma 5.1. Every probability distribution Pr,s,t is equivalent to the PR box
described in (10).
Proof. For the case P0,0,0 the lemma trivially holds. Without loss of gener-
ality, lets consider the probability distribution Pr,s,t for some (r, s, t) 6= (0, 0, 0).
For each input-output pair (x, a) with x ∈ X and a ∈ A Alice just returns
(s ⊕ x, r ⊕ a) and for each input-output pair (y, b) with y ∈ Y and b ∈ B Bob
just returns (t⊕ y, b). It is easy to see that this way Alice and Bob achieve the
same input-output statistics as the PR box. From now on, a PR box denotes
one of the eight boxes Pr,s,t.
Lemma 5.2. A PR can be used to generate a shared, perfectly secret bit, based
on the non-signaling condition, between two players Alice and Bob.
Assume eavesdropper Eve can learn something about the common secret bit
between Alice and Bob. This means that she is able, from her perspective, to
bias for example Alice’s output bit a ∈ A, e.g. Prob[a = 0] = 12 + ε. As Eve is
in charge of distributing the boxes, she would have to prepare a box with the
following behavior: P (00|00) = 12 +ε and P (11|00) = 12−ε. Because of the non-
signaling condition, the entries for P (ab|01) and P (ab|10) for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B
are given:
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHHA
B
0 1 0 1
0
0 1
2 + ε 0
1
2 + ε 0
1 0 12 − ε 0 12 − ε
1 0
1
2 + ε 0 0 
1 0 12 − ε  0
(15)
It is easy to see that for any ε 6= 0 this box gets signaling which means that Eve
can not, because of the non-signaling condition, bias a box with the behavior
of a PR box. So in the case of a PR box where (x, y) 6= (1, 1) Alice and Bob
directly share a secret bit a = b, and in the case where (x, y) = (1, 1) Bob simply
takes the inverse of his output, resulting in a shared secret bit a = b.
5.2 Magic Square Game and PR Box
We can win the magic square game with a single use of an NL box. In order to
see this, lets assume that Alice and Bob decide on two strategies each, denoted
by (S0A, S
1
A) and (S
0
B , S
1
B), which may look like the following:
S0A =
1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 0
S1A =
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 1
S0B =
1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
S1B =
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 0
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Upon receiving input x ∈ {1, 2, 3} (y ∈ {1, 2, 3}), Alice’s (Bob’s) input into the
NL box is 0 if x ∈ {1, 2} (y ∈ {1, 2}) and 1 otherwise. Alice and Bob then
choose their strategies according to the output of the NL box, e.g Alice will
take strategy S0A if she gets output 0, and S
1
A otherwise.
It is easy to see that all the strategies preserve the parity condition of the game
and that Alice and Bob indeed will always succeed in winning. By randomizing
over the different possible strategies (S0A, S
1
A) and (S
0
B , S
1
B), we can get the
randomized statistics we may want to have.
6 Non-Signaling Attacks
In this section we want to describe an adversary’s (from now on called Eve)
possibilities of an attack. We want to give her as much power as possible,
putting her in charge of providing physical systems or boxes to Alice and Bob,
only constrained to be non-signaling. According to [4] this leads us to a three-
partite scenario with an additional input-output pair (z, e) with z ∈ Z and e ∈ E
for Eve, resulting in a probability distribution P (abe|xyz). It is important to
note that because of the non-signaling condition it must hold that P (ab|xyz) =
P (ab|xy) which means that the probability distribution of Alice and Bob does
not depend on Eve’s input.
Definition 6.1. [4] A valid box partition of a given box PAB|XY is a family of
pairs (pE|Z , PAB|XY ZE), where pE|Z is a weight and PAB|XY ZE is a box such
that
PAB|XY =
∑
e
p(e|z)PAB|XY,Z=z,E=e (16)
We can say that Eve’s measurement result e tells her which part of the
decomposition occurred. As an example consider the following non-signaling
box as depicted in (17) and let p(0|z) = 23 and p(1|z) = 13 , for some z ∈ Z.
PAB|XY =
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHA
B
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 13 0 0
1
3 0 0
1 0 13 0 0
1
3 0
2 0 13 0 0
1
3 0
1
0 13 0 0 0
1
3 0
1 0 13 0
1
3 0 0
2 0 13 0 0
1
3 0
(17)
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With PAB|XY,Z=z,E=0 =
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHA
B
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 12 0 0
1
2 0 0
1 0 12 0 0
1
2 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 12 0 0 0
1
2 0
1 0 12 0
1
2 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
(18)
and PAB|XY,Z=z,E=1 =
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHA
B
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 1 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 1 0
(19)
we can write equation (16) as follows:
PAB|XY =
2
3
PAB|XY,Z=z,E=0 +
1
3
PAB|XY,Z=z,E=1. (20)
We can see that in about a third of the cases Alice and Bob are using a com-
pletely local box, which, after the publication of the input, leads to perfect
knowledge of Eve about the shared bit.
7 A No Signalling and Quantum Key Distribu-
tion Protocol
Barrett, Hardy and Kent [1] developed a quantum key distribution scheme prov-
ably secure against general attacks by an eavesdropper who is limited only by
the impossibility of superluminal signalling. The protocol has two parameters
M and N , as well as the bases
Xr = {cos rpi2N |0〉+ sin
rpi
2N
|1〉,−sin rpi
2N
|0〉+ cos rpi
2N
|1〉}, (21)
for each outcomes 0 and 1 defined by projections onto the first and second basis
elements, respectively. For r ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} they define X−1 and XN to be
XN−1 and X0 with outcomes reversed. Alice and Bob share n = MN2 pairs of
systems
|ψ−〉 = |01〉 − |10〉√
2
, (22)
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choose random riA, r
i
B ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} for i = 1, ...n and measure their i-th
particle in the base Ai := XriA and Bi := XriB . In a next step, they announce all
their bases chosen and restart the protocol unless the number of neighboring or
identical bases is greater or equal 2MN . They then choose one neighboring or
identical pair where Alice uses base Xi and Bob uses base Xi±1 and announce
the measurement results of all the other pairs. If their outcomes a and b are
not anti-correlated in all the cases where they chose neighboring or identical
bases, Alice an Bob abort the protocol. If the protocol is not aborted, their
unannounced outcomes defined the secret bit.
Obviously, it is possible that Alice and Bob do get different measurement results
for a given neighboring or identical pair. In the security analysis of the protocol
they derive the following lower and an upper bound for ts being the probability
that Alice and Bob end up on a different secret bit
1− δδ
′
3N
≥ ts > 1− 12MN , (23)
δ′ being Eve’s advantage and  being a lower bound for the probability of Alice
and Bob not aborting the protocol during one of the test steps. Equation 23
can be rewritten as
δδ′ <
3
2M
(24)
which implies that the key agreement scheme can be made arbitrarily secure by
taking a large M.
7.1 Discussion
Let us now investigate the case where we have a cheating Eve. In order to
have advantage d′ to be 12 she could send one system being completely local,
leaving the rest unchanged. The chance that this system does not get checked is
1
MN2 . The chance that her local system gets tested is (1− 1MN2 ) and the chance
that this test is passed, namely that the local system has opposite measurement
values is at most 1 − 23N . This means that the probability that Eve does not
get caught in the case she is cheating is
Pnot−caught|ψ− ≤
1
MN2
+ (1− 1
MN2
) · (1− 2
3N
). (25)
By setting the number of systems n = MN2 we can rewrite the inequality to
Pnot−caught|ψ− ≤
1
n
+ (1− 1
n
) · (1− 2
3N
)
=
1
n
+ 1− 1
n
− 2
3N
+
2
3nN
= 1− 2
3N
+
2
3nN
Let us now assume that instead of the states |ψ−〉 we would take boxes used
for the magic square game (MSG), where we have three input values, hence
N = 3. Let us now compute Pnot−caught|MSG for this scenario, n again being
the number of systems. The chance that the local system does again not get
checked is 1n , hence the chance that her system gets checked is 1 − 1n . For the
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case the local system is checked we have, as each local strategy has a constant
chance of winning, a probability of getting caught of kN2 , which is equal to
1
9 in
the case of the magic square game. This means that we can write
Pnot−caught|MSG =
1
n
+ (1− 1
n
) · (1− k
N2
)
=
1
n
+ 1− 1
n
− k
N2
+
k
nN2
= 1− k
N2
+
k
nN2
It turns out that there are better chances to get through cheating in the case of
using magic square game boxes. When using those boxes, we have the proba-
bility to get caught:
Pcaught|MSG = 1− Pnot−caught|MSG
=
k
N2
− k
nN2
=
k
N2
· (1− 1
n
)
For the |ψ−〉 boxes we have
Pcaught|ψ− = 1− Pnot−caught|ψ−
=
2
3N
− 2
3nN
=
2
3N
· (1− 1
n
).
This implies that in the case of using |ψ−〉 boxes, the more bases we chose, the
smaller the probability of catching a cheater gets. Let us now consider the case
where there is no cheating Eve. In the case of |ψ−〉 being shared we have that
the probability of Alice and Bob not choosing enough neighboring or identical
bases is of order e−
MN
6 and hence the probability of passing that test is of order
1− e−MN6 . The expected sum of identical or neighboring bases is 3MN so the
expected sum of neighboring bases is 2MN . The probability that Alice and
Bob get different measurement results, given that they measure in neighboring
bases is cos2( pi2N ). This leads us to
Psucc|no−eve,ψ− = (1− e−
MN
6 ) · (cos2( pi
2N
))2MN (26)
= (1− e−MN6 ) · (1− sin2( pi
2N
))2MN (27)
≈ (1− e−MN6 ) · (1− pi
2
4N2
)2MN (28)
For the case where we use magic square boxes, we obviously have
Psucc|no−eve,MSG = 1. (29)
In terms of completeness, it seems to be a good idea to use quantum pseudo
telepathy game boxes, as, if everyone is honest, Alice and Bob would always
succeed in generating a perfectly secure, shared bit. In fact, for the usage of
|ψ−〉 boxes there is a tradeoff: The better you want to be able to catch a cheater,
the less bases you got to chose, which, on the other hand, lowers the probability
of succeeding in the case everybody playing correctly.
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8 Box Transformation
Consider the following scenario: Alice and Bob share a non-signalling box with
input sets (X,Y) and output sets (A,B). In each round, Alice chooses an element
x ∈ X and Bob y ∈ Y randomly, used as input for the box. Note that these
inputs are made public, as described in Section 4. Upon receiving their output
they are now allowed to apply operations to their input-output pairs which
consist of the following:
Definition 8.1. The set of possible local operations:
1. Discard or aggregation of input.
2. Discard or aggregation of output depending on the input.
3. Permutation of output depending on the input.
Definition 8.2. A box P (ab|xy) can be locally transformed to a PR box PPR(ab|xy),
denoted as P (ab|xy) l PPR(ab|xy), if, by applying operations from definition
8.1, one gets an input-output statistics of a PR box.
Example 8.3. A possible, non-signalling box shared by Alice and Bob is de-
picted in (17) and has X = Y = {0, 1} and A = B = {0, 1, 2}. It is easy to see
that if Alice drops all the pairs (xi, ai) with ai = 2 and Bob drops all the pairs
(yi, bi) with bi = 2, they transform the box to a PR box as shown in (10).
Example 8.4. If we take
HHHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHHA
B
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 p 0 0 p 0 0
1 0 p 0 0 p 0
2 0 0 p 0 0 p
1
0 p 0 0 0 p 0
1 0 p 0 0 0 p
2 0 0 p p 0 0
(30)
Bob can apply the following permutation (Operation 3) on his output b in the
case of input x = y = 1: {0→ 2, 1→ 1, 2→ 0}, which would result in
HHHHX
Y
0 1
HHHHA
B
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 p 0 0 p 0 0
1 0 p 0 0 p 0
2 0 0 p 0 0 p
1
0 p 0 0 0 p 0
1 0 p 0 p 0 0
2 0 0 p 0 0 p
(31)
It is easy to see that if Alice and Bob share a box as in (31) and if (like in
example 8.3) Alice drops all the pairs (xi, ai) with ai = 2 and Bob drops all the
pairs (yi, bi) with bi = 2, they transform the box to a PR box as shown in (10).
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9 Requirements for a Perfectly Secret Bit
In association with perfectly secret and shared bits there are two requirements
which have to be fulfilled. First, we need correctness, meaning that the output
used for bit agreement needs to be either perfectly correlated or anti-correlated.
On the other hand, we also need secrecy, preventing any attacker from success-
fully biasing the shared bit.
Definition 9.1. Let Plocal−det be a local deterministic box. It has the prop-
erty that for any input pair (x, y) there is only one output pair (a, b) with
Plocal−det(ab|xy) = 1.
Definition 9.2. Let PPR,emb be a box which can be transformed into a PR box
by only discarding entries having value equal to 0. Such a box gets signaling as
soon as |X| > 2 or |Y | > 2.
Definition 9.3. Let Pnot−disc be a box which has some perfectly correlated or
perfectly anticorrelated outputs, and the rest filled up with probability zero.
Definition 9.4. Let Psec be a non-signalling box which can be used by Alice
and Bob to generate a common perfectly secret bit.
9.1 Requirements for Systems with Input Dimension 2
In the case of binary input, the need for secrecy and correctness implies that,
in order to have a perfectly secret bit for Alice and Bob, we need either a PR
box with perfectly correlated output (correctness) or else a non-local box, from
which we could extract a PR box by deleting input and output, as described in
Section 8. From now on, the part of a probability distribution P (ab|xy) getting
discarded is denoted by Pdisc(ab|xy). Additionally, we need to make sure that
Eve fails to perform a box partition attack (secrecy) (Section 6). This implies
that Eve’s only possibilities of partitioning must be in such a way that the PR
part remains unchanged (i.e. that it does not split into different parts) and
that the whole local rest corresponds to the part being discarded by Alice and
Bob. Let us call such boxes, which allow Alice and Bob to have perfect secrecy
Psucc(ab|xy).
Lemma 9.5. A probability distribution P (ab|xy) with |X| = |Y | = 2 can be
used to generate a shared, perfectly secret bit, if it can be written as
P = PPR,emb + Pdisc (32)
and if the following holds: For any Plocal−det and
T = P − Plocal−det (33)
where exists a tuple (a, b, x, y) for which holds that
(Plocal−det(ab|xy) = 1) ∧ (PPR,emb(ab|xy) 6= 0), (34)
we have
∃(a′, b′, x′, y′) : T (a′b′|x′y′) = −1. (35)
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Proof: Assume we have a non-local probability distribution
P = PPR,emb + Pdisc
which is vulnerable to a non-signaling box partition attack. This implies that
there must exist a valid partitioning
P = (1− wlocal−det)Pnon−signalling + wlocal−detPlocal−det
such that
∃(a, b, x, y) : (Plocal−det(ab|xy) = 1) ∧ (PPR,emb(ab|xy) 6= 0).
This and the fact that P is non-signalling implies
∀(a, b, x, y) : P (ab|xy)− Plocal(ab|xy) > −1.

Example 9.6. The following box
P =
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 2
5
0 0 2
5
0 0
1 0 2
5
0 0 2
5
0
2 0 1
5
0 0 1
5
0
1
0 2
5
0 0 0 2
5
0
1 0 2
5
0 2
5
0 0
2 0 1
5
0 0 1
5
0
(36)
can be written as (32) with
PPR,emb := P (ab|xy), a < 2, b < 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
Pdisc := P (ab|xy), a = b = 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
Now lets consider a grid Plocal−det with entries where indicated in P by the
lightgray shades. This grid fulfills (34) but violates (35). For the sake of com-
pleteness, a possible partition attack is given: P =
4
5
·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 1
2
0 0 1
2
0 0
1 0 1
4
0 0 1
4
0
2 0 1
4
0 0 1
4
0
1
0 1
2
0 0 0 1
2
0
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
+
1
5
·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 1 0
resulting in a winning probability of 15 · 12 = 110 for Eve.
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Example 9.7. The following box
P =
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 1
9
0 0 1
9
0 0
1 0 1
9
0 0 1
9
0
2 2
9
2
9
3
9
2
9
2
9
3
9
1
0 1
9
0 0 0 1
9
0
1 0 1
9
0 1
9
0 0
2 2
9
2
9
3
9
2
9
2
9
3
9
(37)
can be written as (32) with
PPR,emb := P (ab|xy), a < 2, b < 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
Pdisc := P (ab|xy), a = b = 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
Now lets consider a grid Plocal−det with entries where indicated in P by the
lightgray shades. This grid fulfills (34) and but violates (35). For the sake of
completeness, a possible partition attack is given: P =
8
9
·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1
8
0 0 1
8
0
2 2
8
2
8
3
8
2
8
2
8
3
8
1
0 1
8
0 0 0 1
8
0
1 0 1
8
0 1
8
0 0
2 1
8
2
8
3
8
1
8
2
8
3
8
+
1
9
·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 0 0
resulting in a winning probability of 19 · 12 = 118 for Eve.
Example 9.8. The following box
P =
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 1
4
0 0 1
4
0 0
1 0 1
4
0 0 1
4
0
2 1
2
0 0 0 0 1
2
1
0 1
4
0 0 0 1
4
0
1 0 1
4
0 1
4
0 0
2 1
2
0 0 0 0 1
2
(38)
can be written as (32) with
PPR,emb := P (ab|xy), a < 2, b < 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
Pdisc := P (ab|xy), a = b = 2, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
A possible grid Plocal−det for example with entries where indicated in P by the
lightgray shades fulfills (34). It is easy to see that P also meets (35) as P (20|11)
has value 0. To see that this applies to any possible grid fullfilling (34) is tedious
but straightforward.
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9.2 Requirements for Systems with Higher Input Dimen-
sion
9.2.1 The case of binary output
As we already know, the most general way to build a probability distribution
P for secret bits is such that it prohibits any kind of box partition attack. Due
to privacy, the entries which do not get discarded, Pnot−disc, need to be either
perfectly correlated or perfectly anti-correlated. Please note that both Pdisc and
Pnot−disc may be signaling. As a motivating example let us look at the following
probability distribution:
Example 9.9.
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0
1
2
0 1
2
0     0 1
2
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
    1
2
0
1 0
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
0    
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
   
2 0  
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
0  
1   0 1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
 
3 0    
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
0
1     0 1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
4 0 0
1
2
    1
2
0 1
2
0
1 1
2
0     0 1
2
0 1
2
(39)
Note that the tiny boxes indicate any values that complement the box to a non-
signaling probability distribution. The box only containing those box-values is
denoted as Pdisc and the rest as Pnot−disc. Although this box can not be trans-
formed into a PR box, Alice and Bob are able to generate a perfectly secret bit
(see next) by discarding all the input entries indicated by those tiny boxes.
We now want to characterize a probability distribution P for the case of
binary output.
Lemma 9.10. A probability distribution P with |A| = |B| = 2, |X| = m and
|Y | = n can be used to generate a shared, perfectly secret bit, if it can be written
as
P = Pnot−disc + wPdisc (40)
w ∈ {0, 1}
and if the following holds: For any Plocal−det and
T = P − Plocal−det (41)
we have
∃(a, b, x, y) : T (ab|xy) = −1. (42)
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Obviously, w must be equal to 1 if Pnot−disc l PR.
Proof: Assume we have a non-local probability distribution
P = Pnot−disc + Pdisc
which is vulnerable to a non-signaling box partition attack. This implies that
there must be a valid partitioning like
P = (1− wlocal)Pnon−signalling + wlocalPlocal. (43)
This implies further that Plocal enables a Plocal−det as in (41). Because of the
non-signaling condition we finally have that
∀(a, b, x, y) : P (ab|xy)− Plocal(ab|xy) > −1.

As a special case it is easy to see that if Pnot−disc can be transformed into a
PR box, the lemma is trivially true.
Example 9.11. Lets consider the following box P with |X| = |Y | = 3 and
|A| = |B| = 2:
P =
0 1 2
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0
1
2
0 1
2
0  
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
 
1 0
1
2
0 0 1
2
 
1 0 1
2
1
2
0  
2
0      
1      
(44)
We can write
P = Pdisc + Pnot−disc with
Pdisc = P (ab|22), a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
Pnot−disc = P (ab|x < 2, y < 2), x < 2, y < 2,
Pnot−disc being a PR box. It is easy to see that all possible Plocal−det (e.g.
the one indicated by the lightgray shade), when subtracted from Pnot−disc would
result in an entry equal to -1 (e.g. for P (00|11)).
Example 9.12. Lets consider the following box P :
P =
0 1 2
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0
1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0
1 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
1 0
1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0
1 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
2
0 1
2
0 0 1
2
 
1 0 1
2
1
2
0  
(45)
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If we put a perfect anti-correlation distribution into the tiny boxes, we would
have a PR box for x, y ∈ {1, 2} and hence a box for perfectly secret bits, but if
we insert a perfect correlation distribution, the whole box would become local as
indicated by the lightgray shaded entries.
9.3 The General Case
In this subsection we want to generalize the requirements for secret bits for
boxes with arbitrary input and output dimension.
Lemma 9.13. A probability distribution P can be used to generate a shared,
perfectly secret bit, if it can be written as
P = Pnot−disc + Pdisc (46)
and if the following holds: If for any Plocal−det and
T = P − Plocal−det (47)
there exists a tuple (a, b, x, y) for which holds that
(Plocal−det(ab|xy) = 1) ∧ (Pnot−disc(ab|xy) 6= 0), (48)
we have that
∃(a′, b′, x′, y′) : T (a′b′|x′y′) = −1. (49)
Proof: Assume we have a box P for which exists a Plocal−det with a tuple
(a, b, x, y) fulfilling (48). Further assume that each entry of T = P − Plocal−det
is greater that −1. This directly leads us to a possible partition attack, namely
the Plocal−det.

10 Perfect Security and Feasibility
In Section 9 we dealt with probability distributions or boxes and analyzed their
structure needed in order to generate perfectly secret bits. Obviously, what
we are now interested in is whether such boxes can be implemented by the
means of quantum mechanics or not. Navascues, Pironio and Acin [6] introduced
a hierarchy of conditions which need to be satisfied by any box P resulting
from two separate observers locally measuring on shared quantum states with
outcomes a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
They state that a box Pαβ admits a quantum representation if there exists a
joint quantum state ρ on HA⊗HB and two sets of projection operators, namely
Eα = E˜α⊗ I acting on Alice’s system and Eβ = I⊗ E˜β acting on Bob’s system,
such that Pαβ = tr(EαEβρ). Projectors belonging to the same measurement
should be pairwise orthogonal and sum to the identity. For example, let A10 be
a projector of Alice’s which states that measurement, or input, is 1 and result,
or output, is 0. On the first level of the hierarchy they use the set of all single
projectors including the identity operator, like for example in the case of binary
input and binary output S = {1, A00, A10, A01, A11, B00 , B10 , B01 , B11}, in order to
build the matrix Γ where
Γi,j = tr(S
†
i Sjρ). (50)
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So as an example tr(A0†0 B
1
0ρ) would correspond to the probability P (00|01).
Note that an entry like tr(A0†1 A
1
1ρ) is not valid which is why a variable is put in
place there. They state that for every box, in order to be implementable by the
means of quantum mechanics, the variables of the matrix Γ constructed from
this box must have an assignment making the whole matrix positive semidefinite,
namely Γ  0.
10.1 The Case of Binary Input and Binary Output
In order to start with the case of binary input and binary output, let us in-
vestigate the PR box. According to the previous section, the matrix looks as
follows:
Γ′ =
1 A00 A
0
1 A
1
0 A
1
1 B
0
0 B
0
1 B
1
0 B
1
1
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
A00
1
2
1
2
u v w 1
2
0 1
2
0
A01
1
2
u 1
2
v′ w′ 0 1
2
0 1
2
A10
1
2
v v′ 1
2
w′′ 1
2
0 0 1
2
A11
1
2
w w′ w′′ 1
2
0 1
2
1
2
0
B00
1
2
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
u′′′ v′′′ w′′′
B01
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
u′′′ 1
2
v′′′′ w′′′′
B10
1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
v′′′ v′′′′ 1
2
w′′′′′
B11
1
2
0 1
2
1
2
0 w′′′ w′′′′ w′′′′′ 1
2
(51)
As A00 = 1−A01, A10 = 1−A11, B00 = 1−B01 and B10 = 1−B11 , we can write
Γ =
1 A00 A
1
0 B
0
0 B
1
0
1 1 12
1
2
1
2
1
2
A00
1
2
1
2 u
1
2
1
2
A10
1
2 u
1
2
1
2 0
B00
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 v
B10
1
2
1
2 0 v
1
2
(52)
In order to be positive semidefinite, all minors of Γ, e.g. the following ones,
have to be greater or equal to zero:
ΓPR = u2v2 +
1
4
uv − 1
2
uv2 − 1
2
u2v (53)
Γ2,3,4,5 = −14v
2 − 1
4
u2 + u2v2 +
1
4
u− 1
2
uv − 1
16
+
1
4
v (54)
Γ3,4,5 = −12v
2 (55)
Γ4,5 =
1
4
− v2 (56)
Γ5 =
1
2
(57)
Γ2,3,5 = −12u
2 (58)
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Since − 12v2
!≥ 0 (55) we have v != 0 and since − 12u2
!≥ 0 (58) we have u != 0 .
The substitution into Γ2,3,4,5 gives us
Γ2,3,4,5 = − 116 < 0
which means that Γ is not positive semidefinite and, as we already knew, that
the PR box has no physical representation in the quantum world.
Lemma 10.1. Any probability distribution P with |A| = |B| = 2 which can
be reduced to a PR box results in a matrix Γ which is not positive semidefi-
nite, which implies further that P (ab|xy) is not implementable by the means of
quantum mechanics.
Proof: Let us consider the construction of the matrix Γ for a P containing
a PR box. Without loss of generality, let Ax, Ax
′
, By and By
′
be the four
input values with the output statistics of a PR. This means that we can directly
extract the minor ΓPR corresponding to the probabilities for those four values.
From above we know that ΓPR is not positive semidefinite which means that Γ
is not, neither.

Lemma 10.2. The following box
P =
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0
1
2
0 1
2
0
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
1 0
1
2
0 p ε
1 0 1
2
ε p
(59)
with
p =
1
2
− ε (60)
ε > 0 (61)
can not be implemented by the means of quantum mechanics.
Proof: Again, let’s consider the Γ matrix:
Γ =
1 A00 A
1
0 B
0
0 B
1
0
1 1 12
1
2
1
2
1
2
A00
1
2
1
2 u
1
2
1
2
A10
1
2 u
1
2
1
2 p
B00
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 v
B10
1
2
1
2 p v
1
2
(62)
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The following minors have again to be greater or equal to zero in order for Γ to
be positive semidefinite.
Γ =
1
4
pv + u2v2 − 1
2
upv +
1
4
up− 1
8
p− 1
2
uv2 − 1
2
u2v +
1
4
uv
Γ2,3,4,5 = −14v
2 +
1
2
pv − 1
4
u2 + u2v2 +
1
4
u− 1
2
uv − upv + 1
2
up− 1
16
+
1
4
v − 1
4
p
Γ3,4,5 = −12v
2 + pv − 1
2
p2
Γ4,5 =
1
4
− v2
Γ2,3,5 = −12p
2 − 1
2
u2 + up
Γ1,2,3 = −u2 + 12u
Γ2,3 =
1
4
− u2
Γ3,5 =
1
4
− p2
From Γ4,5, Γ2,3 and Γ3,5 we have
−1
2
≤ v ≤ 1
2
−1
2
≤ u ≤ 1
2
−1
2
≤ p ≤ 1
2
. (63)
From Γ2,3,5 we have
−1
2
p2 − 1
2
u2 + up ≥ 0 ⇔
−(p2 + u2 − 2up) ≥ 0 ⇔
−(p− u)2 ≥ 0 ⇔
p = u.
and Γ3,4,5 gives us
−1
2
v2 + pv − 1
2
p2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−(v2 − 2pv + p2) ≥ 0 ⇔
−(v − p)2 ≥ 0 ⇔
v = p.
This means that we have u = v = p. Substituted into Γ2,3,4,5 we get
Γ2,3,4,5 = p4 +
1
4
p− p3 − 1
16
(64)
p4 + 14p− p3 − 116 ≥ 0 (64) has the following solution:
p ≤ −1
2
p ≥ 1
2
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Combined with Equation 63 we get
p1 = −12
p2 =
1
2
We can skip p1 as we do not have negative probabilities in a box. If we look at
Equation 60 we see that p = p1 = 12 requires ε = 0 which leads to a contradiction
in Equation 61.

We can show the same way that every box P with |A| = |B| = |X| = |Y | = 2
with three times perfect correlation or anticorrelation as in 65
1 0
0 1
,
0 1
1 0
(65)
can not be implemented if the fourth output pair is of the following form with
ε > 0
1
2 − ε ε
ε 12 − ε
. (66)
Lemma 10.3. Every box P with binary output, containing a box as 62 can not
be implemented by the means of quantum mechanics.
Again, by construction, the matrix Γ of a box P containing a box as 62
contains a minor directly corresponding to 62. This implies that such a Γ is not
positive semidefinite.
10.2 The Case of Binary Output and More Input
In Lemma 9.10 we learned that subtracting any possible local deterministic
strategy from a Psec results in an entry of minus one. We now want to work
out further properties. As we know, a PR is secure and hence any P containing
such a PR box is secure as well. On the other hand, we saw in Example 9.9 that
there exist Psec not containing a PR box. Let us now assume we have such a
Psec = Pnot−disc + wdiscPdisc (67)
wdisc ∈ {0, 1}
Pnot−disc l PR (68)
Obviously, we need wdisc to be equal to 1, because in the case of wdisc = 0, Psec
would not be secure anymore (68). We further can assume that for each entry
P (ab|xy) of Pdisc there must exist
1. x′, such that
∑
a,b Pnot−disc(ab|x′y) = 1 and
2. y′, such that
∑
a,b Pnot−disc(ab|xy′) = 1,
because if 1 (2 ) is violated, we can discard the corresponding column (row).
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Lemma 10.4. For a feasible box P any subbox P ′, comprising a subset of the
inputs of P , has to be feasible as well.
Proof: Again, using the same argument as in the sections above we can say
that as soon that some subbox P ′ is infeasible, it’s matrix ΓP ′ is not positive
semidefinite which implies that ΓP is not, neither.

We know that for every Psucc there does not exist a local-deterministic strategy
or grid. Let Pmin be the smallest subset of inputs of Psucc not admitting such a
local-deterministic strategy. From above we know that on each row and on each
column there must exist at least one entry containing perfect correlation or anti-
correlation, so without loss of generality, let’s say that for a given input x and y
we have that Pmin(ab|xy) corresponds to one of those diagonal entries. Now let
us have a look at x-the row of Pmin. If there are no more diagonal entries on that
row we know that this row does not contribute to the fact that there is no grid
for Pmin, which means that Pmin is secure without that row. But as this would
be a contradiction to the minimality of Pmin, we know that there must be at
least one other y′ such that Pmin(ab|xy′) is diagonal. Using the same argument
we know that also on the y-th column there exists a x′ with Pmin(ab|x′y) being
diagonal. Because of the non-signaling condition, Pmin(ab|x′y′) must be of the
following form:
Pmin(ab|x′y′) = wc 1 00 1 + (1− wc)
0 1
1 0
(69)
wc, wa ≥ 0
wc + wa =
1
2
Case A: If 0 < wc < 1 we know from Lemma 10.3 that P can not be imple-
mented by the means of quantum mechanics.
Case B:For x ∈ {0, 1} let wc = x be the case of P ′ being a PR box. In this
case we know from Lemma 10.1 that a box as P can not exist.
Case C: In this case we know that wc = x complements P ′ to a local box.
As Case A and B make the whole box infeasible, we know that we must have
a Case C, which further means that again either the x′-row or the y′-th col-
umn does not help preventing a possible grid so far. Hence, the only possibility
left is that there are two more diagonal entries, namely one for Pmin(ab|x′′, y′)
and one for Pmin(ab|x′, y′′). Obviously, we now have new input pairs such as
Pmin(ab|x′′y′) for which we can again conclude, using analysis of the three Cases
A, B and C, that preserving feasibility enlarges the part of Pmin being local.
If we continue until all the input pairs of Pmin have been analyzed we see that
Pmin is feasible if and only if the whole box is local which means that the box
is not secure at all.
10.2.1 Conclusion
Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner [3] showed in their article that, in the case
of binary output, in order to get perfectly correlated, uniformly distributed and
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secure output we would need unlimited inputs. Now, we have seen that quantum
mechanics does not allow us to generate a box with a finite number of inputs
to produce perfectly secure, shared bits between two parties. Moreover, we’ve
found out that perfect secrecy requires maximal non-local correlations. As we
know, pseudo telepathy equips us with some perfectly correlated output, e.g. the
intersection bit in case of the magic square game. Unfortunately, the only way
of making perfect correlation secret is, in case of finite input, to have maximal
non-locality which permits any quantum simulation. This finally means that
the principle of quantum pseudo telepathy games does not help us generating
perfectly secure, shared bits.
10.3 The Case of Binary Input and More Output
Let us consider the case of three outputs A = B = {0, 1, δ} with δ being
discarded. As we know, for a common secret bit we need a PR part inside the
box, which leads us to the following:
P =
0 1
0 1 ∆ 0 1 ∆
0
0 a 0 δ1 a 0 δ1
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2
∆ δ3 δ4 δ5 δ8 δ9 δ10
1
0 a 0 δ6 0 a δ6
1 0 a δ7 a 0 δ7
∆ δ3 δ4 δ11 δ8 δ9 δ12
(70)
where
δ5 = 1− 2a− δ1 − δ2 − δ3 − δ4
δ10 = 1− 2a− δ1 − δ2 − δ8 − δ9
δ11 = 1− 2a− δ3 − δ4 − δ6 − δ7
δ12 = 1− 2a− δ6 − δ7 − δ8 − δ9.
If we look for example at δ3 and δ9 we see that if they are both greater than
zero, there is the following partition attack (let a ≥ δ3 ≥ δ9 and v = (1 − δ9)).
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P =
v ·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 av 0
δ1
v
a
v 0
δ1
v
1 0 av
δ2
v 0
a
v
δ2
v
2 δ3−δ9v
δ4−δ9
v
δ5−δ9
v
δ8−δ9
v 0
δ10−δ9
v
1
0 av 0
δ6
v 0
a
v
δ6
v
1 0 av
δ7
v
a
v 0
δ7
v
2 δ3−δ9v
δ4−δ9
v
δ11−δ9
v
δ8−δ9
v 0
δ12−δ9
v
+ δ9 ·
0 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 1 0
1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
(71)
Thus, in order to have a secure box, we require δ3 > 0⇒ δ9 = 0 and vice versa,
or simply: δ3 · δ9 = 0. In the same manner, we can now write such requirements
for all the deltas:
δ3 · δ9 = 0 (72)
δ4 · δ8 = 0
δ1 · δ7 = 0
δ2 · δ6 = 0
δ1 · δ6 = 0
δ2 · δ7 = 0
δ9 · δ4 = 0
δ3 · δ8 = 0
The system of equations above has four solutions:
[δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9] = [δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, 0, 0, 0, 0] (73)
[δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9] = [δ1, δ2, 0, 0, 0, 0, δ8, δ9] (74)
[δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9] = [0, 0, δ3, δ4, δ6, δ7, 0, 0] (75)
[δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9] = [0, 0, 0, 0, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9] (76)
If we construct the matrix Γ from P (79) we can extract the submatrix contain-
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ing the PR part with the variables x1, x3, ...:
ΓPR =
1 A00 A
1
0 A
0
1 A
1
1 B
0
0 B
1
0 B
0
1 B
1
1
1 1 a+ δ1 a+ δ2 a+ δ6 a+ δ7 a+ δ3 a+ δ4 a+ δ8 a+ δ9
A00 a+ δ1 a+ δ1 x1 x3 x4 a 0 a 0
A10 a+ δ2 x1 a+ δ2 x7 x8 0 a 0 a
A01 a+ δ6 x3 x7 a+ δ6 x13 a 0 0 a
A11 a+ δ7 x4 x8 x13 a+ δ7 0 a a 0
B00 a+ δ3 a 0 a 0 a+ δ3 x16 x18 x19
B10 a+ δ4 0 a 0 a x16 a+ δ4 x22 x23
B01 a+ δ8 a 0 0 a x18 x22 a+ δ8 x28
B11 a+ δ9 0 a a 0 x19 x23 x28 a+ δ9
Again, it is enough to investigate the reduced matrix of ΓPR. If we rename the
two remaining variables to u and v we get the following:
ΓPR,r =
1 A00 A
1
0 B
0
0 B
1
0
1 1 a+ δ1 a+ δ6 a+ δ3 a+ δ8
A00 a+ δ1 a+ δ1 u a a
A10 a+ δ6 u a+ δ6 a 0
B00 a+ δ3 a a a+ δ3 v
B10 a+ δ8 a 0 v a+ δ8
(77)
If we substitute the solutions from 73 we get
Γ′PR,r =
1 A00 A
1
0 B
0
0 B
1
0
1 1 a+ δ1 a a+ δ3 a
A00 a+ δ1 a+ δ1 u a a
A10 a u a a 0
B00 a+ δ3 a a a+ δ3 v
B10 a a 0 v a
(78)
Here are the minors:
Γ1,2,3,4,5 = −2u2a2v − u2a2 − δ1δ23a2 − 2δ3u2av + u2δ23a− 2δ1uav2 + 2δ1ua2v
+2a2uvδ3 − a2v2 + u2v2 + 2ua3 + 2a3v + δ1δ3a2 − δ1av2 − u2δ3a
−2ua2v − a4 + 3δ1a2v2 − 2ua2v2 + 6ua3v − δ21δ3a2 + δ21av2 − 2δ1a3v
−2uδ3a3 + 2a5 + 2a3v2 − 4a4v − 4ua4 + 2u2a3 + 3u2δ3a2
Γ2,3,4,5 = −a2v2 + δ1δ3a2 − δ1av2 − u2a2 − u2δ3a+ u2v2 + 2ua3 − 2ua2v − a4 + 2a3v
Γ3,4,5 = δ3a2 − av2
Γ4,5 = a2 + δ3a− v2
Since the following equation system
Γ1,2,3,4,5 ≥ 0
Γ2,3,4,5 ≥ 0
Γ3,4,5 ≥ 0
Γ4,5 ≥ 0
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has no solution we have that Γ′PR,r (78) is not positive semidefinite which implies
that ΓPR is not, neither. It is easy to show that for all of the four solutions
above, ΓPR,r is not positive semidefinite, which means that P (79) can not be
implemented by the means of quantum mechanics.
Lemma 10.5. Any P containing a box as in 79 can not be implemented by the
means of quantum mechanics.
Proof: Also here, by the construction of the matrix Γ we can extract the sub-
matrix corresponding to 79 from which we know that it is not positive semidef-
inite.

In the section about binary output we have seen a box P (88) which is also
not implementable. Let us have a look at this box, embedded in a box with
output dimension three.
P =
0 1
0 1 ∆ 0 1 ∆
0
0 a 0 δ1 a 0 δ1
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2
∆ δ3 δ4 δ5 δ8 δ9 δ10
1
0 a 0 δ6 p ε δ6
1 0 a δ7 ε p δ7
∆ δ3 δ4 δ11 δ8 δ9 δ12
(79)
with
p = a− ε (80)
ε > 0 (81)
Let now P ∈ Pnot−disc except for (x, y) = (1, 1). We now want to have a look
at the values p, ε, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9, δ12, given all the other probabilities of P . There
are the following possible cases:
Definition 10.6. The four cases are:
1. p 6= 0
2. p = 0, Equations(72) 6= 0
3. p = 0, Equations(72) = 0, ε = 0
4. p = 0, Equations(72) = 0, ε 6= 0
10.4 The Case of Input and Ouput greater than 2
Definition 10.7. A box P is called 4feasible if and only if all possible subboxes
P ′ of P with |X| = |Y | = 2 (called 4-tuple) of input pairs are feasible. The box
is called 4infeasible if there exists at least one such 4-tuple which is infeasible.
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Conjecture 10.8. Assume we are at some point t of the opening process of a box
P for which holds that the box is, at the moment of t, 4feasible and that the box
enables a local-deterministic strategy not only covering output being discarded.
Further assume that opening a next input pair, point t’, sets the box in a state
where it is still 4feasible. This means that there still exists a local-deterministic
strategy for the new box.
From Claim 10.8 it would follow that if we are at point t′, having a box
P preventing a local-deterministic strategy, the box is either 4infeasible, or,
at a point before, t, it already prevented such a strategy.This could be used in
order to show that we can not generate a perfectly common secret bit with a
single usage of a box: Assume we have a secure box which is 4feasible. This
means that if we remove an input-output pair, the box is still secure. As the
box was 4feasible in the original state, it stays so, no matter which part of
the box we remove. Thus, we have that the box, at another step before, was
already secure. If we would continue, we would finally get to a box with input
dimension 2 which would be secure and feasible, but we know that this is not
possible.
10.4.1 Example
Consider the following box for which there does not exist a box partition attack.
All the input pairs belonging to Pdisc are indicated by the empty boxes. Let us
now, for example, start with the three input pairs (2, 3), (3, 3) and (3, 4) with a
possible grid indicated by the lightgray shaded boxes.
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2       a 0 δ2
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0      
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2      
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0      
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0   
1    0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2   
δ    0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0   
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2
δ       0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 δ2       0 a δ2 0 a δ2
δ 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0 0 δ4 0
(82)
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Input pair (2, 4) might correspond to Case 1 (see Definition 10.6):
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2       a 0 δ2
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0      
1 0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2      
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0      
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1    0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2
δ    0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a δ2 0 a δ2 0 a δ2
δ       0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 δ2       0 a δ2 0 a δ2
δ 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0 0 δ4 0
(83)
As a next step we might add input pairs (1, 2) and (2, 2). Because of the non-
signaling condition, if we land in Case 2 we would automatically also land in
Case 4. So we can land either in Case 1 or in Case 3. For Case 3 we would need
P (δ, 0|1, 3) = a and P (δ, 1|1, 3) = a + δ1 which would make the box signalling,
as
∑δ
b=0 P (δ, b|1, 2) = δ1 <
∑δ
b=0 P (δ, b|1, 3) = 2 · a + δ1. Therefore, the only
case left preserving the partition attack is Case 1. From here it is easy to
see that if (1, 4) is opened in Case 1, we automatically would have a case 4
for (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 4) and (1, 4) which would make the whole box secure but
infeasible.
10.4.2 Second Example
Let us consider the following box P , for which there exists a partition attack.
All the input pairs belonging to Pdisc are indicated by the empty boxes. Let us
now, for example, start with the three input pairs (2, 3), (3, 3) and (3, 4) with a
possible grid indicated by the lightgray shaded boxes.
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P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a 0 0 a 0       a 0 0
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0      
1 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0      
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4      
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0   
1    0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0   
δ    0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4   
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ       δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 0       0 a 0 0 a 0
δ 0 δ1 0       δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
(84)
Input pair (2, 4) might correspond to Case 1:
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a 0 0 a 0       a 0 0
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0      
1 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0      
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4      
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1    0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ    0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ       δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 0       0 a 0 0 a 0
δ 0 δ1 0       δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
(85)
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As a next step we might add input pairs (1, 2) and (2, 2) in order to land, for
example, in Case 2:
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a 0 0 a 0       a 0 0
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 0 a 0   
1 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 a 0 0   
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4   
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1    0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ    0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ       δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 0       0 a 0 0 a 0
δ 0 δ1 0       δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
(86)
In this example, Case 2 does not make the whole box infeasible, but, on the
other hand, it destroys our partition attack. Never the less, we can change the
whole grid:
P =
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ 0 1 δ
0
0 a 0 0 a 0 0       0 a 0
1 0 a 0 0 a 0       a 0 0
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0       0 δ1 0
1
0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 0 a 0   
1 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 a 0 0   
δ 0 δ1 0 0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4   
2
0    a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1    0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ    0 δ1 0 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
3
0       a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0
1       0 a 0 0 a 0 0 a 0
δ       δ2 δ3 δ4 δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
4
0 0 a 0       a 0 0 a 0 0
1 a 0 0       0 a 0 0 a 0
δ 0 δ1 0       δ2 δ3 δ4 0 δ1 0
(87)
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In the same manner we can continue and we would see that we never land in
Case 4.
11 Epsilon Security
In cryptography, we often do not require perfect secrecy, which suggests the
investigation of boxes where the part not getting discarded does not contain
perfect correlation or anti-correlation but values comprising a small error. In
the case of binary input and output, a PR box with errors would look like this:
P =
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0
1
2 − µ1 µ1 12 − µ2 µ2
1 µ1 12 − µ1 µ2 12 − µ2
1 0
1
2 − µ3 µ3 µ4 12 − µ4
1 µ3 12 − µ3 12 − µ4 µ4
(88)
Let us assume that the only output used for bit agreement is for input x = y = 0.
It seems to be an interesting question to see how small we can make µ1 for
correctness, still preventing a box-partition attack as well as possible, for secrecy.
The local-part of a box can be quantified as follows:
Locality(P ) = 2 ·
4∑
i=1
µi (89)
Obvioulsy, we want to keep locality as small as possible as the more local the
box is, the more a partition attack gets enabled, resulting in a more insecure
box. This leads us to the following problem of semidefinite programming, where
for a given µ1 we try to minimize the locality under the constraint that the Γ
matrix is positive semidefinite:
For a given µ1 :
min(
∑4
i=2 µi)
subject to
ΓP  0
In order to solve this problem, we made use of a free toolbox for MATLAB
called YALMIP [5], a modelling language for defining and solving optimization
problems. The results are listed in the table below:
µ1 Locality
0.1 0.5904
0.01 0.6507
0.001 0.7136
0.0001 0.7380
0.00001 0.7462
0.000001 0.7488
(90)
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As we can see in the table above, there seems to be a tradeoff between secrecy
and correctness, namely the better the correlation we have, the worse secrecy
gets.
12 Conclusion and Further Work
Even though, at a first glance, the concept of quantum pseudo telepathy seemed
to be a promising way, we have seen that, even in addition to discard of input, it
does not help on establishing perfect secrecy by the means of quantum mechan-
ics. We have learned that, in the case of binary output, in order to get perfectly
correlated and perfectly secret bits, we would need maximal non-locality which
prohibits any quantum simulation.
It would be interesting to see wheather we would be able to gain more secrecy
in the case of input and output dimensions being both greater than two. Ad-
ditionally, as we often do not require perfect secrecy in cryptography, it would
be newsworthy to investigate systems not containing perfect correlation or anti-
correlation, but comprising small errors.
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